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ARGUMENT FROM PERSONAL NARRATIVE: A
CASE STUDY OF RACHEL MORAN’S PAID FOR:
MY JOURNEY THROUGH PROSTITUTION
Katherine Dormandy
Abstract: Personal narratives can let us in on aspects of
reality which we have not experienced for ourselves, and
are thus important sources for philosophical reflection. Yet
a venerable tradition in mainstream philosophy has little
room for arguments which rely on personal narrative, on
the grounds that narratives are particular and testimonial,
whereas philosophical arguments should be systematic and
transparent. I argue that narrative arguments are an im-
portant form of philosophical argument. Their testimonial
aspects witness to novel facets of reality, but their argu-
mentative aspects help us to understand those facets for
ourselves. My argument takes the form of a case study
of the exemplary narrative argument penned by Rachel
Moran, a former prostitute who uses her experiences to
argue that prostitution amounts to sexual abuse. We’ll see
that narrative arguments can enjoy expository advantages
over analytic ones.
1 Introduction
Rachel Moran’s memoir Paid For: My Journey Through Prostitution (2013)
narrates how Moran entered prostitution, what she experienced there, and
how she left. But first and foremost it is an argument. One of its main
conclusions is that prostitution amounts to sexual abuse. Moran uses
this conclusion to argue further that the “Nordic model” is the right way
to legislate about prostitution: pimping and paying for sex should be
criminalized, and prostituted people should be given opportunities to earn
livings by other means.
Arguments from personal narratives are employed in such areas as
public policy and advocacy.1 The idea is for advocates and policymakers
to understand the types of experience had by those they are trying to help,
empower, or bring justice to, so as to form true beliefs about how best
1 Meyers (2009), Code (2006). Harding (2004) explores their use in other areas too.
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to do so. The underlying assumption is that listening to people’s stories
from their own viewpoints—and ideally in their own words—is often the
best way to gain such understanding. This is especially so when the stories
belong to marginalized people and feature aspects of reality that are foreign
to the advocates or policymakers themselves.
Yet a venerable tradition in mainstream philosophy has little room
for arguments from personal narrative, on the grounds that narratives
are particular, anecdotal, and ambiguous, whereas philosophical premises
should be universal, systematic, and clear. Brison (2002, 23) calls attention
to this foundational quote from Bertrand Russell:
The free intellect will value more the abstract and universal
knowledge into which the accidents of private history do
not enter, than the knowledge brought by the senses, and
dependent, as such knowledge must be, upon an exclusive
and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs
distort as much as they reveal. (1969, 160)
Although philosophy has intuition pumps, which are stripped-down
narratives, these are slotted within a systematic expository structure and
supposed to be accessible to anyone with minimal imaginative expenditure
(cf. Stump 2010, 23–26). Personal narratives, by contrast, are structured
like stories and tend to describe events foreign to readers. Moreover, they
are testimonial—and although belief on other people’s say-so is necessary
for life, it is not how philosophy is understood to work.2
But I argue that narrative arguments are an important form of philo-
sophical argument. They occupy a middle ground between testimony and
analytic reasoning, but are reducible to neither. Their narrative aspect
testifies to the narrator’s experience, so that someone who has undergone
nothing like it can gain at least some sense of what it was like (to the extent
that this is possible). But the narrator does not expect readers to rely on
her word about the nature of her experience or about what conclusions
to draw from it. The argumentative aspect of narrative arguments guides
readers in understanding the experience, and others of the same type, for
themselves. My study of Rachel Moran’s narrative argument in Paid For
shows how this works in one exemplary case.
I’ll begin by distinguishing some characteristic features of narrative argu-
ments (section 2). I’ll then give an analytic schema of Moran’s argument
that prostitution amounts to sexual abuse (section 3). The purpose is in no
sense to “reduce” her argument to an analytic structure, but to explore the
epistemic relations between her story and the claims she uses it to advance.
I want to show philosophers in analytic terms that a narrative argument
can be philosophically respectable. But I also want to show philosophers,
indirectly, that there are important expository features that an analytic
presentation must omit. Section 4 discusses the way in which Moran’s
2 For an alternative perspective on moral beliefs, see Jones 1999.
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narrative supports her premise and section 5 discusses how this premise
supports her conclusion. Section 6 offers some concluding discussion about
what narrative arguments can achieve over and above analytic ones, and
on the importance of their being non-fictional.
I join a growing contingent of philosophers who are exploring the philo-
sophical significance of narratives (see Brison 2002, ch. 2; Meyers 1993,
227–232; Meyers 2009; Code 2006; Freedman 2006; Stump 2010; Harding
2004; Nussbaum 1990; Carroll 2002; Currie 1995; Goldie 2012). My main
aim is to understand and promote narrative argument as a philosophical
form by appeal to a salutary example. But I would not have picked Paid
For if I did not think it had much going for it. Thus, although I will not
be arguing directly for Moran’s conclusion that prostitution is sexually
abusive, my discussion of her narrative argument will support it.
2 Narrative Arguments
A narrative is a communication of connected events, fictitious or actual.3
Narratives can be used to advance arguments by giving readers epistemic
access to certain types of experience that can expand their moral and con-
ceptual perspectives (Nussbaum 1990, Stump 2010, Carroll 2002, Currie
1995, John 1998, section 6 of this paper). But narratives that are presented
as true have a persuasive power beyond fiction, as section 6.2 argues. Be-
cause of this, and because advocacy and public policy argue from true
narratives (Brison 2002; Meyers 2009; Harding 2004; and Code 2006, ch.
5) the present discussion focuses on the latter. Unless otherwise specified,
“narrative” will mean “narrative presented as true.”
A narrative argument can have multiple authors. On one common setup,
a marginalized person who has had the experiences in question works
with an advocate to articulate them, while the advocate draws out their
implications for public policy.4 But such arguments might also be penned
by a single author. Rachel Moran’s post-prostitution self, for instance,
is advocating for current prostituted people as well as (in a sense) for
her own prostituted past self. She wants to bring readers to understand
her particular experience as being sexually abusive, and through this to
understand that prostitution is a sexually abusive type of experience.
Narrative arguments contain three salient features. One is the conclu-
sion, which distinguishes a narrative argument from a narrative simpliciter;
the conclusions of interest here are philosophical.5 One sort of conclu-
sion claims that a certain type of experience falls under a certain general
3 I am thinking of it here as the product, not the process, of narrating.
4 See Code 2006, ch. 5; Meyers 2009. With multi-author texts not every author need be a
narrator, but this complication won’t concern us here. In discussing narratives presented as
true, I will leave aside literary-critical quandaries about the relationship between the narrator
and the author.
5 Narratives lacking explicit conclusions, perhaps because penned in haste or under duress,
can still point toward conclusions or have morals; see Meyers 2009.
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category—such as Moran’s claim, to be discussed below, that prostitution
experiences amount to sexual abuse. Another sort of conclusion pertains
to the right thing to do given a certain understanding of that type of
experience; Moran argues for the Nordic legislative model.
The second feature of a narrative argument, which I’ll call the baseline
narrative, tells the story that is used to motivate the conclusion.6 The aim
of the baseline narrative is to depict the narrator’s experience for unfamiliar
readers. Since experiences unfold in time, the narrative format is better
suited to depicting them than the systematic and a-temporal analytic format,
as section 6.1 argues. A baseline narrative is responsible to the facts, so it
is important that the narrator do her best to select the events she depicts
in an even-handed way, drawing out the aspects of her experience that are
needed to support her conclusion without omitting details that would speak
against it.
Third is what I’ll call the narrative reflection. This includes the nar-
rator’s expository reflections on the baseline narrative and on the issues
raised there, and it connects the (particular) baseline narrative with her
(philosophical) conclusion. Narrative reflection can, but need not, contain
explicitly deductive or probabilistic moves. The baseline narrative and
narrative reflection are often (and in Moran’s case) woven into each other
rather than presented as distinct.
Here is how argumentation and testimony come together in narrative
arguments. It is in the spirit of argumentation that the narrative reflection
guides the reader from the baseline narrative to the conclusion, enabling
readers to follow her reasoning for themselves. But it is in the spirit of
testimony that the narrator asserts that her baseline narrative occurred and
selects which events to include and omit. The reasoning of a narrative
argument can, like that of an analytic argument, be assessed on its own
merit. Assessing the testimonial aspects of a narrative argument, by contrast,
requires gauging the narrator’s sincerity and cognitive competence.
One way to explore a type of philosophical argument is to spend a whole
paper surveying its general features. Another is to present an exemplar,
such as a Gettier case for argument by counterexample. I’ll do the latter by
turning to a study of the narrative argument presented by Moran in Paid
For. General remarks follow in section 6.
3 An Analytic Schema of Moran’s Narrative Argument
This section gives a schema of Moran’s narrative argument. The purpose
is not to attempt the misguided task of reducing it to analytic form. I
aim merely to distill the logical and evidential relations between Moran’s
claims and the reasons she gives for them. I hope to show philosophers
that an argument from personal narrative can be analytically watertight.
6 Meyers (2009) gives a breakdown of the components of a baseline narrative.
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But I also hope to show philosophers, indirectly, some of the limitations
of the analytic form when it comes to gaining philosophical insight from
experiences that are very different from one’s own. Hence, although my
analytic presentation of Moran’s reasoning does motivate her conclusion,
readers (at least, those who have not been prostituted themselves) should
expect to be persuaded in a different and more effective way by her memoir
itself.
To begin, Moran’s (2013) discussion is limited to cases (the majority)
in which the prostituted person is a woman and the client is a man.7 Her
description of prostitution can be expressed by the following constitutive
rule:
The Constitutive Rule of Prostitution: In an act of prostitution,
(i) the prostituted woman, in exchange for the client’s payment,
engages in specified sexual acts even if she does not desire them or
is actively averse to them; (ii) both parties are aware that this is
what she contracts to do;8 and (iii) the payment is the prostituted
woman’s reason for engaging in the acts, such that she would not
do so without it.
Concerning (i) and (ii), Moran says that “[f]emale pleasure does not belong
in prostitution, and both male and female participants intuitively under-
stand that it has no place there” (166). Concerning (iii), “[m]oney was our
wind-up mechanism. That is how we were controlled” (284).
Much of Paid For argues for this claim:
The Abuse Claim: Prostitution amounts to sexual abuse.9
It is tempting to read this as claiming that prostitution is necessarily abusive,
where the necessity is conditional on the workings of human psychology—
that is, on human cognition and behavior being as they actually are. Moran
refers to acts of prostitution as “abnormal ways of interaction [which] cause
human suffering” (233), where “abnormal” seems to mean psychologically
unhealthy; and she attributes a fundamental discord between the notions
of sex and of work to “human nature” (222).
But the Abuse Claim is not about psychological necessity. It is not even
a universal generalization over all actual cases of prostitution. Although
Moran says that all instances of prostitution which she has been acquainted
with (either her own or her companions’) amounted to sexual abuse, she
does not exclude the actual or counterfactual possibility—in certain highly
unusual circumstances—that an instance might lack certain abuse-making
characteristics. For example, in commenting on the film Pretty Woman,
7 It also excludes trafficking, though Moran argues that there is a continuum between traffick-
ing and non-trafficking cases (226–227).
8 This clause applies even when the acts involve feigning enjoyment (or even enjoyment itself,
though Moran says that this is nearly unheard of (162)), for the client is still aware that the
prostituted woman contracts to perform the act regardless of enjoyment.
9 This claim can be found throughout Paid For; see pages 112 and 294 for examples.
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where a prostituted woman and her client fall in love, Moran says “I do
not contend that that scenario is impossible, only that it is highly unlikely”
(167–168), where we may assume that (genuine) love is incompatible with
sexual abuse.
What she is claiming instead, I take it, is that an overwhelming majority
of actual cases of prostitution, if not all of them, amounts to sexual abuse,
and that so does a very large majority of counterfactual yet psychologically
possible ones. Moreover, the more similar a counterfactual case of prosti-
tution is to actuality, the smaller the chance that case stands of not being
sexually abusive. Prostitution itself is sexually abusive, on this reading,
because its constitutive rule is almost guaranteed to yield abuse in any
psychologically possible instance.
Let’s summarize this interpretation of the Abuse Claim as follows, where
the necessity is psychological:
The Near-Necessity Claim: Almost necessarily, instances of prosti-
tution amount to sexual abuse.
Moran does not expect readers to see automatically how this can be.
For she recognizes the steep learning curve faced by those who have never
been prostituted: “What I am certain of is that the sexual humiliation of
prostitutes is not simply underrated by many non-prostitutes (both men
and women alike) but rather is unappreciated entirely;” with the result that
“it is simply not understood” (110).
One of Moran’s strategies for advancing the Near-Necessity Claim is by
induction from this premise:
The Particular Premise: My experiences in prostitution amounted
to sexual abuse, and so did those of every other prostituted woman
whose experiences I became acquainted with (101–119).
The link between the small set of instances countenanced by the Particular
Premise and a claim spanning most if not all psychologically possible
cases of prostitution is dialectically fragile. Potential counter-instances lurk
(see section 5). Because the Near-Necessity Claim has room for actual
and counterfactual exceptions, no single counter-instance can vitiate the
induction to it from the Particular Premise—but a trend of counter-instances
might. We’ll see that Moran’s argument for the induction is in part an
attempt to defuse alleged counter-instances.
The Particular Premise might simply be believed on testimony, but
Moran’s ambitions are greater: she wants readers to understand why
it is true. Once we do this, we will—the thought goes—be in a position
to apply the category of abuse to further actual and counterfactual cases
of prostitution. And this will put us in a position to evaluate the induc-
tion to the Near-Necessity Claim by ourselves. For this induction gains in
plausibility to the extent that Moran’s readers can see in the very concept
of prostitution the near guarantee that its concrete applications will be
abusive.
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Understanding why instances of a type of thing belong to a certain
category entails a sort of intellectual ability: the ability to perceive a
relation between those instances and that category (Grimm 2010, 340–
341).10 There are two salient ways to confer understanding. One is by
analytic definition: a reader might come to grasp abstract and systematic
definitions of the type of thing and of the category it is claimed to belong
to. A second way to confer understanding is deictically: by showing the
reader various instances of the type in various contexts, and pointing to the
features which place the instances in the category in question. Consider
the difference between using a botanical treatise to learn to recognize the
poisonous mushrooms, as opposed to following a botanist through a forest.
The deictic strategy comes into its own when firsthand experience of the
type of thing is helpful for recognizing the features which place it in the
category at issue. This strategy is arguably the better one when it comes
to recognizing poisonous mushrooms, as well as for understanding the
experience of non-mainstream people such as prostituted women.11
Moran employs this deictic strategy. In the baseline narrative she de-
scribes many actual cases of prostitution, showing them in various lightings
and from various angles. In the narrative reflection she points out the
properties of those cases which (she claims) make them abusive. The hope
is that readers acquire the ability to recognize abuse in novel and even
counterfactual prostitution scenarios.
The following analytic discussion is like the botanical treatise; it distills
from Paid For abstract descriptions of the abuse-making properties of
prostitution, which is something. But it lacks the deictic input that will
help us learn how to recognize those properties in concrete situations.
What we will and won’t get from my analytic presentation should convince
philosophers that narrative arguments in general, and Moran’s in particular,
have much to recommend them.
4 The Particular Premise
This section discusses Moran’s support for the Particular Premise. An initial
question is why it needs support at all; isn’t it cynical or vulgar not to
take Moran’s word for it that she and others were sexually abused? Not
necessarily. Scrutinizing a story can affirm and protect its value (Brison
2002, 34). Since some narratives are incompatible, a heuristic policy of
taking all narratives at uncritical face value would have “the ultimate effect
that no victimization claim can be taken seriously” (ibid.). Scrutiny of a
10 The understanding at issue here is factive, for if prostitution is not sexually abusive then
Moran has mis-understood it.
11 Stump (2010) uses a deictic strategy that draws on Biblical stories to confer understanding
of how God can be believed good even in the face of extreme suffering; pages 371–374
summarize her methodology.
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narrative can stem from the desire to take it as seriously as you responsibly
can.
A motivation for the Particular Premise must support two of its entail-
ments: first, that Moran and her acquaintances had the experiences she
describes; second, that sexual abusiveness can appropriately be ascribed to
those experiences. Let’s look at each claim.
4.1 Trustworthiness of the Narrative
For the first claim, readers are reliant on Moran’s testimony. Yet Code
(2006, 176) points out that, when a narrator’s aim is to advance a conclu-
sion, one might worry about her “spinning” her story at the expense of
accuracy (cf. Goldie 2012, 157). Spin need not be malicious—it can be
motivated by a genuine desire to help those you are advocating for. But the
threat of it could undermine the Particular Premise.
One might absolve Moran from this worry by arguing that there can
hardly be a reasonable motivation to fabricate a story the telling of which
makes the narrator so vulnerable.12 Indeed, this consideration should
dispose us to trust Moran for general claims, such as that she was pros-
tituted. But—unfortunately—it is less relevant to trusting her for the
particular prostitution experiences that she narrates. If anything, public
scrutiny gives people a stronger motivation to show themselves in a flat-
tering or compassion-worthy light. This reason for skepticism, however,
must be balanced against the fact that Moran comes from a marginalized
group. Non-prostituted readers should recognize how likely they are to
harbor biases (including implicit ones) against the prostituted and otherwise
marginalized, and should strongly consider compensating by adjusting their
credences in favor of the latters’ testimony (Fricker 2007, Holroyd 2012,
Saul 2013).
Given these competing considerations about gauging Moran’s sincerity,
positive reasons to trust can only benefit her argument. Moran realizes this
and buttresses her claim to sincerity. One way in which she does this is
by noting her decision (made with much agonizing) not to write under a
pseudonym: “[h]ow could I consider my account truthful if it were stamped
on the cover page with a name that was not my own? Would I not have
been guilty of presenting its readers with a dishonesty before they’d even
opened the first page?” (Moran 2013, 10). This is no appeal to the fact
of her vulnerability as a reason to believe her. Rather, Moran is taking a
stand by her testimony, staking her honor and her name on the truth of her
words. But she is also giving readers as many of the tools as she is morally
permitted (short of violating the privacy of companions still in prostitution)
to investigate her as a beliefworthy source for themselves. In doing these
things Moran is availing herself of both the testimonial and argumentative
features of the narrative-argument form.
12 I owe this point to Freedman 2015.
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Brison calls our attention to another issue arising in evaluating a nar-
rator’s trustworthiness (2002, 30). This pertains not to deliberate but
inadvertent inaccuracy, arising in a narrator’s memories. The vicissitudes
of memory are notorious,13 since memories are strongly influenced by
our current beliefs, affects, and concepts. One might worry that Moran’s
cognitive processes, guided by her current views about the abusiveness
of prostitution, may have built inaccurate details into her memories that
support an ascription of abusiveness.14
It must be acknowledged that surprising things can be misremembered
(Chabris and Simons 2010, chapter 2). Yet a “guilty-until-proven-innocent”
attitude toward Moran’s memory is unwarranted, for she is drawing on a
vast manifold of memories from almost a decade’s worth of events. And
she does what she can to show readers that she tried hard to be responsible
as a witness to her past. She says for example that writing Paid For “was
a long, slow and painful process” (291); “I had to understand [what had
happened to me], and to do so I had to fully remember. I had to open the
door on a lot of things I really didn’t want to” (270). Moran’s sharing the
difficulty of the introspective process while assuring us of her prioritizing
the truth is helpful, especially given that other resources for counteracting
potential defeaters to memory are limited. As we saw, she is for example
morally bound to maintain confidentiality about other prostituted women
who might have served as corroborating witnesses.
Moreover, we must not be distracted from the epistemic benefits of
remembering from a temporal distance. Particularly when the remembered
experience is of the psychological order of abuse, a person might not in
the moment experience the full force of emotions appropriate to it. Yet
emotions are keys to moral dimensions of reality (Nussbaum 1990, Currie
1995, Carroll 2002, and section 6), so suppressing them will hamper a
person in understanding her experience when it occurs. Only much later,
with time to process the experience, do appropriate and revealing emotions
have the chance to develop (Freedman 2006; Goldie 2012, 55). Moran
says that, after leaving prostitution:
I began to interpret my prostitution abuse on an intellec-
tual, as well as a deep, personal level. This was a new way
of understanding . . . ; being able to decode and compre-
hend [prostitution’s] structure and the way it operates is
to reach an understanding of its dynamics on a level that
both terrifies and saddens in an altogether new way. (280)
Moran provides the tools to see how her reflections stand a good chance of
accuracy—even greater accuracy than her experiences in the moment.
13 For a survey see Chabris and Simons 2010, ch. 2.
14 Some go as far as to argue that for this reason there can be no autobiographical truth
whatsoever. Lamarque (2004) addresses this rather postmodern objection (cf. Goldie 2012,
154–155).
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4.2 Ascribing Abusiveness to Moran’s Experiences
Let’s look at the second claim entailed by the Particular Premise—that
abusiveness is the correct ascription for Moran’s and her colleagues’ pros-
titution experiences. Here is where the analytic form is at a special dis-
advantage. Moran’s baseline narrative portrays various events to which
she applies the concept of sexual abuse. Without this virtual “seeing” of
abusiveness in various contexts, readers of an analytic presentation are left
only with a conceptual discussion which, given their own experiences and
background beliefs, they may or may not find plausible.
In order to support the ascription of abusiveness to her experiences,
Moran’s first move is to note that it is conceptually possible for a pros-
tituted woman to be sexually abused. This needs to be pointed out, she
says, because many people suppose that, in renting your body to another
person, you temporarily relinquish your say over what happens to it. “The
traditional view of abuse victims is one of people who in no way solicit their
abuse”; hence prostituted women, “by way of our ‘profession,’ are unable
to lay claim to our experiences of having been abused” (107). Yet in fact,
Moran says, prostituted women state in advance of the act what they are
willing and unwilling to do, and in spite of this “[o]ften a man would molest
a woman in exactly the way he knew she least wanted to be molested, to
maximize his own sadistic pleasure” (174). Any sexual-boundary violation
constitutes abuse.
But Moran goes further and claims that a sexual act can be abusive
even when the prostituted woman permits it. Moran gives four reasons for
thinking this, each drawn from experiences in which clients did only what
they were permitted. First, even in such cases, prostituting herself simply
felt like abuse: “I felt the same sickening nausea and rising panic that is
inherent to conventional sexual abuse in each prostitution experience I ever
had, and I felt that regardless of whether or not a man stayed within the
agreed sexual boundaries” (112).
Second, even in such cases, Moran and other women had to regularly
perform psychological contortions while prostituting themselves, such as
extreme dissociation (chapter 13). “It is clear to me,” she notes, “that
when a person needs to practice and perfect a state of mental lock-down
(as prostitutes so commonly do) in order to stand the sexual acts they are
enduring, that person is being abused” (110).
Whereas the first two reasons pertain to Moran’s and others’ feelings
while prostituting themselves, the third and fourth touch on things that
one might only be peripherally aware of in the moment or even fail to
notice at all until much later. Third: The abovementioned dissociation, she
says, does not cease once a client has gone; rather, “[o]ver time it becomes
second-nature,” resulting in an “unnatural separation of self” (143); “it
was true for me in prostitution and I saw it everywhere I looked” (143).
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The fourth reason why even permitted sexual acts in prostitution can
be (and indeed are) abusive is that the broader effects of performing them
match the effects of more “conventional” forms of sexual abuse:
humiliation on a sexual level does not contain itself within
the sphere of the sexual; it leaks out all over a life, most
particularly so if it is repetitive and ritualistic. Drug and
alcohol addiction, the annihilation of confidence, the shat-
tering of self-worth, physical self-harm, suicidal ideation;
all of these are well-recognized as the ‘fruits’ of sexual
abuse. All of these I have seen in abundance in prostitution.
(110)
These four reasons support an ascription of abusiveness to Moran’s experi-
ences in prostitution, including to experiences that she permitted. These
reasons draw on what Moran and her companions were aware of while
prostituting themselves, and on what happened to their bodies and minds
as a result. Because of this, it will be easier to see how these reasons support
the Particular Premise if one has something closer to a phenomenal grasp of
what those experiences were like from Moran’s or her companions’ point
of view—and a narrative can bring us much closer to this than an analytic
argument can.
5 The Near-Necessity Claim
The Particular Premise provides an inductive basis for the Near-Necessity
Claim. In the classic case of induction, a collection of particular claims (say,
that that swan is white, that that other swan is white, and so forth) is used
as a basis from which to draw the general conclusion that all swans are
white. A sighting of a non-white swan falsifies this general claim, but it
does not falsify the less general claim that most swans are white.
The Near-Necessity Claim is like the claim that most swans are white. It
does not generalize over all cases of prostitution, either actual or psychologi-
cally possible. Because of this, a small number of counter-instances—that is,
situations in which prostitution is not sexually abusive—will not falsify it.
A sizeable trend of disconfirming instances, however, may falsify it. Hence
the better a case Moran’s opponents can make for the existence or psycho-
logical possibility of a trend of counter-instances (even if the factors making
these instances non-abusive were sadly absent for Moran and her compan-
ions), the closer they will come to falsifying the Near-Necessity Claim—that
is, the closer they will come to showing that it is not prostitution as such
which is (almost necessarily) sexually abusive.
One sort of counter-instance is actual: a trend of non-abusive cases
of prostitution that have actually occurred. The other sort is counterfac-
tual but psychologically possible. The next two sections discuss Moran’s
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responses to actual and counterfactual apparent counter-instances, respec-
tively. Her responses draw on her story to give a fuller picture of sexual
abuse in prostitution than we’ve seen so far. Once again, my analytic
presentation is skeletal by comparison.
5.1 Actual Purported Counter-Instances
Moran expects some current and former prostituted women—perhaps
enough to constitute a falsifying trend—to deny that their experiences
amounted to sexual abuse: “[t]here will be prostitutes out there who will
not like the sound of this. . . . I am certain of it because I would not
have liked the sound of it myself. . . . I’m sure also that there’ll be some
former prostitutes who’ll not appreciate it either” (111). Such women will
deny, for example, that they mentally dissociate or feel out of control with
clients.
What we have is a situation of the sort envisaged by Brison (2002)—(see
section 4.1), in which multiple private stories describe the same type of
event in incompatible general terms, challenging the claim that that type
of event is relevantly similar for all or most who experience it. Here the
burden of proof is on Moran, for her claim covers her own experiences and
her interlocutors’, whereas the latters’ covers only their own. This situation
calls to mind Brison’s caution against overgeneralizing from one’s own case
(2002, 29).
Moran does two things to defuse these actual purported counterexam-
ples. First, she presents an error theory for her interlocutors, arguing that
self-deception about their own experience is to be expected: “[s]urviving
in prostitution is not possible for those who have a consistent, consciously
held view of the self as vulnerable. It is necessary to lie to yourself here”
(131). Because of this, “[t]here is a fantasy some women in prostitution
indulge in: that they are exceptionally strong, in control of all of this, far
above being abused” (111). This error theory does not show that benign
experiences of prostitution never occur. But it provides a sensible alternative
explanation for the appearance of such cases, both to outsiders and to the
women concerned.
How are non-prostituted readers to adjudicate between the other wom-
ens’ denial of having been abused, on the one hand, and Moran’s expla-
nation for their likely self-deceit, on the other? From the outside, all we
can do is gauge their respective trustworthiness as testifiers. It would help
if we had some means to assess the plausibility of these competing claims
on their own merit. This is where Moran’s baseline narrative comes in
once more. Note that it is against the backdrop of our own experiences
that we gauge the plausibility of a claim. A narrative can provide a “vir-
tual” experience of what prostitution might to some extent be like. Hence,
Moran’s baseline narrative might help us understand why abusiveness is by
far the rule and not the exception in prostitution (if this is so), and why it
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makes psychological sense to deny that one is undergoing it. Yet without a
baseline narrative to provide the raw phenomenal material, as readers and
philosophers we are epistemically hobbled.
5.2 Counterfactual Purported Counter-Instances
Some think that if only the world were different in certain respects, then
prostitution would not be damaging to prostituted women (Shrage 1989,
Ericsson 1980). In such cases, goes the objection, it would not be abusive
either. If this is so, then, in counterfactual worlds which are different in
the respects at issue, we might have a non-abusive trend of psychologically
possible cases of prostitution. The more cases this trend encompasses, and
the closer they are to the actual world, the better a chance they have of
falsifying the Near-Necessity Claim. Consider the following counterfactual
scenario:
The Normalization Scenario: Prostitution is considered completely
normal. There is no social stigma attached to it; it is regarded like
any other job, so that having “sex worker” on your CV poses no
hindrance to a post-prostitution career. Social programs ensure
that prostituted women can receive training for other jobs if they
wish. Robust security creates a strong incentive for clients not to
breach prostituted women’s stated sexual boundaries.
Why do the objectors think that normalized prostitution would tend not to
be abusive? Because the differing social constitution of prostitution, they
assert, will alter the experiences of clients and prostituted women alike.
Clients will conceptualize interactions with prostituted women as the
receipt of a valued service, not as demeaning them; this will incline them
against behaving demeaningly. As for the prostituted woman, she will
mentally represent interactions with clients in terms of concepts related
to professionalism, not violation or humiliation. Granted, because she is
still performing sexual acts to serve another, she won’t be “fram[ing] the
boundaries of her sexual experience” (Moran 2013, 112). But this will
not feel abusive, because her clients will uphold her dignity throughout,
buffering her against the sort of humiliation wreaked by sexual trauma.
Some objectors maintain that the Normalization Scenario is close enough
to actuality that it can be brought about merely through legislation and
campaigning for different social attitudes (Ericsson 1980). If this is so, then
it could pose a serious threat to the Near-Necessity Claim.
Moran (2013) responds by arguing that prostitution, despite its re-
vamped social constitution, still amounts to abuse in the Normalization
Scenario. Pace the objector’s optimistic forecasts, normalization will not
“take what is wrong about prostitution and somehow make it right” (218).
The constraints of human psychology ensure that prostitution will remain
abusive in the vast majority of cases.
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To see why, we must dig deeper into what Moran takes to be abusive
about prostitution. Here again we lose out by lacking the insider view
provided by her narrative portrayal. But let’s say what we can. Abuse is
a “mis-use” of something in a way that tends to damage it,15 and sexual
abuse is a damaging “mis-use” of persons in a sexual capacity. To see why
Moran takes prostitution to fit this description even in the Normalization
Scenario, recall the Constitutive Rule: the prostituted woman, in exchange
for the client’s payment (and for no other reason), engages in sexual acts
even if she does not desire them or is actively averse to them, such that
both parties are aware that this is going on and that the other is aware of it.
Note that the word “sexual” makes all the difference. Altering the type of
act and the actors yields many acts that are not abusive. For example, a
child, in exchange for dessert (and for no other reason), eats his Brussels
sprouts even if he does not desire them or is actively averse to them, such
that both he and his parent are aware that this is going on and that the
other is aware of it. Why do specifically sexual acts with this structure
make for abuse, whereas sprout-eating acts generally don’t?
Moran’s answer, I take it, is that sexual acts involve the whole of the self—
psychological and physical—in an intense and sui generis way. Because of
this, an act of prostitution does a deep and sui generis sort of violence to
her very person. There are two aspects to this violence. First, having one’s
sexual aversions realized is violating in and of itself; narratives in which this
occurs can drive this point home in a way that abstract reflection cannot.
Second, having one’s sexual aversions realized in a context deliberately
structured so that the other party can ignore this amounts to a denial of
one’s personhood. A prostituted woman “is treated like a blow-up sex
doll come to life” (105); “[i]n prostitution, men dehumanize women and
women dehumanize themselves in order to be able to perform the acts
men require of them” (181). This interpersonal element too can be better
portrayed through narrative descriptions than conceptual elucidation.16
Both of these aspects of violence to a prostituted woman’s person—the
realizing of her aversions and the disregard of this—are psycho-physical.
The flesh-on-flesh ignoring of her subjectivity gives the lie to external
socially constituted conceptions. Both the prostituted woman and her
clients know that she is “there for one reason and one reason only—so that
[her] body would be used as a receptacle for their sperm” (91). Because
of this, prostituted women will still experience interactions with clients as
shameful—not because society says it is but because “shame is simply an
inevitable response” (118) to dehumanization. Even if society approves of
prostitution, “[t]he semen is the fly in the ointment” (222). If anything,
prostituted women will be worse off in the Normalization Scenario. A
social conception of prostitution that diverges so drastically from their own
15 Cf. Oxford English Dictionary Online, March 2016, especially entries 2(a) and 6(b).
16 But see Estes 2001, whose argument makes a similar case in purely analytic terms. See also
Pateman 1983.
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experience will leave them without the concepts to articulate this jarring
disjunct (107).17
As for the client’s viewpoint, regardless of his socially constituted concep-
tion of prostitution, buying sex will not be like paying for any other service,
because to avail himself of it there is person whom he has to dehumanize
(102).
In order for the Normalization Scenario to have a shot at being non-
abusive, sexual acts themselves—not just sexual acts in prostitution—would
need an entirely different socially constituted meaning that divorces them
from the whole of the person. Is such a world psychologically possible?
This is doubtful, because psychology is determined not just by society but
by biology, and there are good evolutionary reasons to think that emotional
bonding is built into healthy human sexual relations and psychological
fragmentation into unhealthy ones. Yet even if this scenario is within the
remit of psychology, it is so drastically far from the actual world as to not
pose much of a challenge to the Near-Necessity Claim.
Once more, the plausibility we ascribe to these conceptual reflections
depends partly on our experiences and background beliefs, so the non-
prostituted among us who lack the virtual-experiential aid of a narrative
are in an epistemically impoverished position. This is the difference that a
narrative portrayal of prostitution is in a better position to make than an
analytic discussion.
6 The Expository Strengths of Factual Narratives
My analytic presentation has shown how Moran’s case for the Abuse Claim
hangs together logically and evidentially, and I hope that this shows the
potential for narrative arguments to be philosophically rigorous. I hope
also to have conveyed understanding, in the deictic manner of appealing
to exemplars, of why narrative arguments are better suited than analytic
ones to expositing claims about experiences very different from readers’
own. I’ll finish by providing a more systematic motivation for this claim, in
response to two objections.
6.1 The Expository Advantages of Narrative
The first objection grants that particularized testimony promotes under-
standing of certain types of experience better than systematic argumentation
does. But it says that little seems to be won by presenting this testimony in
narrative form. Surely we could just as easily slot a selection of testimonial
anecdotes into a series of systematically arranged points. We would still be
availing ourselves of the narrative, while maintaining the philosophically
tried-and-true analytic structure.
17 The result will be what Fricker (2007) calls a “hermeneutical injustice” (chapter 7).
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In response, we may grant that narratives are often fruitfully used in
systematic contexts as examples or intuition pumps. But in a work whose
overall structure is narrative rather than systematic, they can do more
(Stump 2010, part 1 and 371–374). To see this, note that experiences do
not occur in isolation; rather, they are framed before and after by other
experiences. These framing experiences are part of what gives the framed
experiences their phenomenal character and psychological significance. A
decontextualized anecdote will be much less able than a contextualized story
to faithfully communicate an experience.18 Narrative argument enjoys at
least two expository advantages over an analytically structured argument.
One is that it is more conducive than an analytic argument to helping
readers perceive moral properties. A sense of progression from one expe-
rience to another, where each experience is infused with the significance
of the previous one, can help readers to imaginatively simulate an experi-
ence had by the character, or an experience of being present in the story
(Walton 1978).19 Such simulated experiences will tend to have emotional
components, such as empathy with the character, or emotions of one’s
own, such as compassion or outrage, directed at the character.20 These
emotions can enhance our moral perception (Nussbaum 1990, Currie 1995,
Carroll 2002, Stump 2010). Feeling empathy or compassion toward a
character, for instance, can attune us to an injustice which she experiences
and which we might otherwise have mislabeled. Moreover, our emotional
receptivity commonly shuts down when we follow systematic logical or
probabilistic chains of reasoning,21 arguably with predictable effects on
our moral perception.
Another expository advantage of the narrative form is this: narrative’s
ability to elicit emotions gives it an edge in encouraging readers to engage in
drawn-out conceptual reflection. If we care about a character, we will tend
to want to do her justice in interpreting her actions; and if we care about
what happens, we will tend to want to understand how individual events
link up within a plot. This affect-driven interest can sustain us through
reflection that we might otherwise be less motivated to pursue (John 1998,
343–344). Insofar as a person must work through an argument in order to
be persuaded by it, an argument with built-in elements motivating readers
to do so enters the world with an expository advantage.
But the objector might also worry about the whole idea of using affective
engagement to discern truths at all. For affections can cloud as much
18 Stump (2010) goes as far as to argue that dissecting stories and pinning their parts under
systematic headings “undermin[es] the whole point of introducing stories into philosophical
reflection” (373).
19 Stump (2010, ch. 4) argues that there is a kind of second-person experience that only
narratives are in a position to relate.
20 With Gendler and Kovakovich (2005), I think that fiction-directed affective attitudes are
genuine emotions, but little hangs on this point; Walton’s (1978) “quasi-emotion” (6) would
serve too. For further discussion see the contributions to Nichols 2006.
21 For discussion see Kahneman 2011, part 1.
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as reveal—think of the parent unable to perceive the evil in his child’s
criminal act. In response, we may note that narrative arguments are no
more inherently obfuscating than analytic ones; apparently valid deductions
can hide ruinous errors in otherwise impressive technicality. The moral is
that we must engage responsibly with any philosophical argument, whether
analytic or narrative.
6.2 The Expository Advantages of Fact over Fiction
Proponents of fiction may object, too: Why think that factual narrative
arguments enjoy any advantages over otherwise identical fictional ones,
given that the same storytelling facility is employed by both? I’ll discuss
three reasons.
First, factual narratives have an advantage over fictional ones when it
comes to supporting inductive arguments. A claim such as “in the fiction,
the character’s prostitution experience was abusive” can only support an
induction to a general claim that prostitution is abusive in the fictional
world. A claim such as “the character’s prostitution experience was in fact
abusive,” by contrast, can (as we’ve seen) support an induction to a general
claim about the non-fictional world.
Second, although both factual and fictional narratives can convey con-
ceptual understanding, factual narratives can do so more directly. To see
why, note that concepts themselves can be employed in make-believe mode:
their extensions in a fictional world might not pass muster were they actual.
For example, “the savvy, insightful [fictional] detective frequently does
things that in real life no sensible person would do (e.g., trusting people one
has only reason to mistrust, putting oneself in danger unnecessarily), but
this does not count against the detective’s intelligence” (John 1998, 341).
Thus, before we are entitled to take a work of fiction to have conveyed
conceptual understanding, we must take the interpretive step of asking
whether the concept’s domain of application is itself one of the things the
work presents as make-believe.22 We make such interpretive judgments
all the time, indeed accurately. But the very fact that this step is necessary
with fiction and not fact puts an expository detour on the way to gaining
conceptual understanding through fictional narratives. Moreover, there is
no pressure on the reader of fiction to traverse this detour; it is perfectly
acceptable to immerse oneself in the fiction without connecting it to reality.
Factual narratives, by contrast, are a form of testimony and hence come
22 Lamarque and Olsen (1994, ch. 15) go as far as to claim that it is inappropriate to take
fiction as providing conceptual understanding at all. But this conclusion is too extreme (John
1998). In order for make-believe to be both comprehensible and enjoyable, there must be at
least some overlap with reality—particularly in the concepts a narrative employs. And there
are much-discussed limitations on fiction’s ability to credibly present concepts, particularly
moral ones, as fictional; see Walton 2008.
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with a doxastic imperative. If we have reason to trust the narrator, then we
arguably should take her concepts as applying to reality.
The third expository advantage of factual over fictional narratives is
that the former can be even more effective than the latter at enabling
accurate moral perception of the narrated situations. This reason is that
our emotions are what enable our moral perception (as I’ve argued), and
there are differences in the emotions we tend to experience toward fact
as opposed to fiction. Consider as an example the emotional state of a
person reading a fictional emergency-room resuscitation drama in which
the patient ultimately dies, as opposed to the reader’s state when the same
words are presented as fact (e.g., in a feature essay in the Sunday paper). At
least two factors make for a difference in the reader’s emotions, and thus
her moral perceptions, in each case.
First, there is a greater metaphysical distance between a reader and a
fictional as opposed to a factual situation. To see what I mean, consider
first that person-directed emotions come more easily, all else equal, to the
extent that the person or situation they are directed at is close to oneself
in one way or another. It is natural, for example, to feel greater and more
nuanced emotion toward people suffering in our own country and time
than toward those in other countries or past or future times. Another form
of closeness that facilitates emotions is metaphysical. A factual character
is separated from the reader by mere space and time. A fictional one, by
contrast, is separated also by a dearth of causal chains or geographical
terrain which, however tenuously, could link the reader to her. Like other
forms of distance, this greater metaphysical distance has a dampening effect
on our emotions toward a character or situation23—and thus on our moral
perception of the situation being narrated.
Second, the emotions we experience toward narrated characters or events
are influenced by our other states and attitudes, and we have different
attitudes when we engage with fact than when we engage with fiction.24
For instance, when engaging with fact we (often) believe that the story is
true. We may also believe that it is inappropriate to use a true story for
purposes common to consuming fiction, such as mere enjoyment or mere
emotional catharsis; we might also be uncomfortable with the prospect of
doing so. Together, our beliefs and attitudes may hold our story-directed
emotions to account, so that our emotional responses to (say) a factual
story of suffering contain a dose of the gravity appropriate to real life.
Because our fact-directed emotions are conditioned by belief and other
reality-responsive attitudes, it is likely that they are at least somewhat more
23 We might of course feel more strongly about a fictional character who, because of the
kind of experiences she undergoes, is more psychologically close to us, than toward a factual
character utterly unlike ourselves. This is consistent with my point, which is ceteris paribus.
We would feel still stronger emotions toward the character resembling us if she were factual.
24 See Walton 1978 and Lamarque and Olsen 1994 for accounts of these differences.
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appropriate to the situation being narrated; thus, that the moral perception
they enable is somewhat more accurate to reality.
7 Conclusion
I hope that my exploration of Paid For has made a good case that philoso-
phers have much to gain by overcoming disciplinary prejudices against
so-called “anecdotes” and recognizing that narrative arguments provide an
important way of forming reasoned opinions about the world. Narrative
arguments enable us to draw on experiences that are very different to our
own, and hence have the potential to reveal very different aspects of reality
from those with which we are familiar.
I have argued that narrative arguments have a sui generis expository
force. This force differs from that of testimony, because the reader is able
to follow their reasoning and acquire understanding over and above mere
belief. And it differs from that of analytic argumentation, because of the
deictic way in which the narrative form can provide understanding and
acquaint us with a person who lived what we are coming to understand.
Moreover, arguments from factual narratives enjoy expository advantages
over arguments from fictional ones.
Finally, I hope to have shown—insofar as an analytic presentation can—
that Moran’s Paid For has a lot going for it as an exemplar of narrative
arguments, and that her conclusion that prostitution amounts to sexual




Brison, Susan. 2002. Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Carroll, Noël. 2002. “The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge.” The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (1): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-6245.
00048.
Chabris, Christopher and Daniel Simons. 2010. The Invisible Gorilla and Other Ways Our
Intuitions Deceive Us. New York: Crown.
Code, Lorraine. 2006. Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Currie, Gregory. 1995. “The Moral Psychology of Fiction.” Australasian Journal of Philoso-
phy 73 (2): 250–259. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409512346581.
Ericsson, Lars O. 1980. “Charges Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical
Assessment.” Ethics 90 (3): 335–366. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292165.
Acknowledgements Thanks for helpful comments to Eleonore Stump and the participants
at the 2015 Annual Conference of the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) Ireland.
Thanks also to the generous support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The
opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
John Templeton Foundation.
620 Katherine Dormandy
Estes, Yolanda. 2001. “Moral Reflections on Prostitution.” Essays in Philosophy 2 (2): article
10.
Freedman, Karyn. 2006. “The Epistemological Significance of Psychic Trauma.” Hypatia
21 (2): 104–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2006.tb01096.x.
Freedman, Karyn. 2015. “Stories Count: Testimony, Gender, and Knowledge.” Dublin:
Presentation at the Annual Conference for the Society of Women in Philosophy (SWIP)
Ireland.
Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gendler, Tamar Szabó and Karson Kovakovich. 2005. “Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions.”
In Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, edited by Michael
Kiernan, 241–253. Oxford: Blackwell.
Goldie, Peter. 2012. The Mess Inside. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/
Oxford.
Grimm, Stephen R. 2010. “The Goal of Explanation.” Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science 41: 337–344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.10.006.
Harding, Sandra. 2004. The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader. New York: Routledge.
Holroyd, Jules. 2012. “Responsibility for Implicit Bias.” Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):
274–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2012.01565.x.
John, Eileen. 1998. “Fiction and Conceptual Thought: Philosophical Thought in Literary
Context.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (4): 331–348. http://dx.doi.org/
10.2307/432124.
Jones, Karen. 1999. “Second-Hand Moral Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):
55–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2564672.
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Lamarque, Peter. 2004. “On Not Expecting Too Much From Narrative.” Mind and Language
19 (4): 393–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2004.00265.x.
Lamarque, Peter and Stein Haugom Olsen. 1994. Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosoph-
ical Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Meyers, Diana Tietjens. 1993. “Social Exclusion, Moral Reflection, and Rights.” Law and
Philosophy 12 (2): 217–232. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02346479.
Meyers, Diana Tietjens. 2009. “Narrative Structures, Narratives of Abuse. and Human
Rights.” In Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal,
edited by Lisa Tessman, 253–269. New York: Springer.
Moran, Rachel. 2013. Paid For: My Journey Through Prostitution. Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan.
Nichols, Shaun, ed. 2006. The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence,
Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha. 1990. Love’s Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pateman, Carole. 1983. “Defending Prostitution: Charges Against Ericsson.” Ethics 93 (3):
561–565. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292467.
Russell, Bertrand. 1969. The Problems of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Saul, Jennifer. 2013. “Scepticism and Implicit Bias.” Disputatio 37: 243–263.
Shrage, Laurie. 1989. “Should Feminists Oppose Prostitution?” Ethics 99 (2): 347–361.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293069.
Stump, Eleonore. 2010. Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walton, Kendall L. 1978. “Fearing Fictions.” The Journal of Philosophy 75 (1): 5–27.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2025831.
Walton, Kendall L. 2008. “Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality.” In Marvelous Images:
On Values and the Arts, edited by Kendall L. Walton, 27–46. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
